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NEW REMEDIES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY OF
JUDICIAL REFORM: TIME AS THE
GREATEST INNOVATOR
IR VING R. KA UFMAN*
INTRODUCTION

A

S the federal judiciary prepares to enter its third century, the Court
of Appeals is caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of an overcrowded docket and the mounting costs of assuring litigants their rightful day in court. As with Odysseus, flexibility must be our lodestar in
meeting the challenge. A new willingness to accept judicial reform must
override our natural prudence in the face of change, lest administration
of the law fall behind the progress of the society we serve. Sir Francis
Bacon admonished:
[I] e that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time
is the greatest innovator; and if time of course alter things to the worse,
and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall
be the end?'
After forty years on the federal bench, I offer the following "wisdom and
counsel" in hopes that future efforts toward judicial reform will receive a
prudent, not a prejudiced evaluation. Meaningful judicial reform in the
next century requires an eagerness to pursue new avenues instead of a
willingness to retrace timeworn paths that have yet to lead us to our
destination.
I.

A.

AN HIsToRICAL OVERVIEW

Origins of the Circuit Courts of Appeals

The United States courts of appeals have so rapidly become a fixture of
our government that it is difficult to believe that they were only formally
instituted in 1891.2 Alexander Hamilton first propounded the idea of
federal circuit courts in The Federalist.3 The Judiciary Act of 17891 had
provided for precursors to the current courts of appeals. These ancient
circuit courts were composed of two Supreme Court justices and one federal district court judge. The Supreme Court justices were intended to
assure national authority and uniformity of decision. The district judge
* Former Chief Judge, now a Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. B.A. 1928, Fordham University; LL.B. 1931, Fordham University School of Law. Judge Kaufman is a recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom.
This Article is based on a paper circulated at the Bicentennial Conference of Judges of

the United States Court of Appeals, October 24-26, 1988, in Washington, D.C.
1. Francis Bacon, Of Innovations, in Bacon's Essays 62, 62 (F.G. Selby ed. 1962).

2. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
3. The Federalist No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
4. ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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was to provide a knowledge of local law and customs. John Jay, our first
chief justice, complained to Congress of the debilitating effect of circuit
riding. In fact, the justices offered to forego $500 of their $3500 annual
salary to provide for relief from their equestrian chores through the appointment of independent, permanent circuit judges in the various
regions.
It was not until 1891 that the current system of circuit courts of appeal
for each circuit was adopted. Like their predecessors, the courts of appeals are branches of the national government, and yet each retains a
regional character. This distinctive blend has marked the history of the
court with which I am most familiar, the Second Circuit. When New
York emerged as the preeminent seaport and mercantile center for the
nation, the Second Circuit, along with the District Court for the Southern District of New York, became the foremost American admiralty
court. At the same time, the unique judicial talent of such luminaries as
Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, Thomas Swan, Charles Clark and Jerome Frank contributed immeasurably to the national development of all
areas of the law.
Along with its substantive reforms, the Second Circuit has also significantly expanded the sphere of judicial reform. I like to think that my
stewardship of the court contributed to this tradition by the addition of
such institutions as the Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP).5 Additionally, the circuit has instituted bold and innovative administrative
programs to preserve oral argument and to expedite the determination of
appeals in a day when other courts have become mired in backlogs. Despite the fact that it is the only federal court of appeals in the country still
permitting oral argument in all cases, the Second Circuit has managed to
clear its calendar completely for the last six consecutive years.6 This record is all the more remarkable in light of the continued growth in the
circuit's docket, which has nearly doubled in the last ten years.7
Of course, caseloads remain at an historic high in other circuits as
well. The familiar aphorism, "justice delayed is justice denied," has
taken on a hollow ring as society has become increasingly numbed to the
harms inflicted by interminable delay. The courts, with alarming frequency, are used as the first, rather than last resort of dispute resolution.
Even in the court of appeals, where I have sat for twenty-seven years, an
enormous number of the litigants exhibit a "sue and be damned" attitude, offering only factually complex tales of obstinacy to reasoned negotiation rather than presenting the pressing legal issues we are meant to
5. See infra Part III.A.; see also Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?The Civil Appeals ManagementPlan, 95 Yale L.J. 755 (1986); Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate ProceduralReform, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1094 (1974); Bell
v. A-Leet Leasing Corp., No. 88-7284, -7296, slip op. (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 1988) (per
curiam).
6. See S. Flanders, The Second Circuit Report 5 figure 1 (1988).

7. See id.
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resolve. Recent statistics reveal that the number of cases commenced in
the United States courts of appeals since 1980 has increased steadily from
23,200 to 35,176 in 1987.8 Clearly, the flood tide of litigation is still
rising.
B.

The CurrentMalaise

The twin demons of cost and delay continue to afflict the judicial process. Learned Hand's stinging indictment of our courts is, if anything,
more true today than it was in 1921: "[A]s a litigant I should dread a
lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death."9 Delay in the resolution of disputes is the most visible, although perhaps not
the most serious, symptom of this judicial malady. Although protracted
litigation is hardly a new phenomenon, our backlogs are nevertheless
grave enough to warrant serious attention. Magellan's crew sailed
around the world in an old wooden ship in three years; yet today the
resolution, or even the commencement of the trial of many serious cases
takes a far longer period.
Delay is, however, but one reason why so many cases which really
should be resolved by a trial are settled long before-or never filed at all.
The sheer monetary cost of seeking judicial relief may well be the greatest barrier to court access. Much of the expense may be attributed to
liberalized discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lawyers have used these procedures as a ready tool for harassment in a process that has become little more than an ordeal for parties subjected, in
effect, to two trials instead of one. It is a customary and often successful
tactic to disable the other party both by burdensome requests for discovery and by release of only the most limited information. During my tenure on the Second Circuit, I recall one recent case that generated over
1,200 depositions comprising nearly 150,000 pages of transcript. My
point is not that we should expect litigants to act out an Alice in Wonderland script and come forward graciously saying "here is damaging information you may use against me." But let us not overlook that the
process of extraction of the facts has become a very expensive exercise,
requiring the services of an attorney or even a corps of counsel, whose
fees may be prohibitively expensive.
The primary impact of the expense and delay in private civil litigation
is felt by the blameless defendant or plaintiff. Before deciding to submit
all the facts at trial to an admittedly fair and detached decision-maker,
each party must consider an externality-the cost of justice itself. With
distressing frequency the expense of a coerced settlement, even after paying court and counsel fees, may be far less than the price of justice. We
8. See L. Mecham, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts 2 table 1, reprintedin Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Mecham Report].
9. Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 Lectures
on Legal Topics 87, 105 (Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 1926).
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long ago eliminated trial by ordeal, but some charge it has been replaced
with ordeal by trial. Delay, moreover, has a deleterious effect on the
outcome of those cases that do come to trial. For example, few witnesses
can recall with precision an accident that occurred four or five years
before. And compensation is deferred far past the time when the injured
plaintiff was plagued by medical and other expenses and most urgently
needed the money.
Perhaps even more serious than delay are the secondary effects on the
future behavior of the offending party. The disabling effect which resort
to the judicial process may have on a putative defendant or plaintiff is the
modem American Ring of Gyges for the unscrupulous litigant. The
strike suit by a shareholder against his corporation is a frequently cited
example. But one can with equal justification point to the slumlord who
turns off his tenants' heat several days each month to save fuel costs,
secure in the knowledge that his tenants will be deterred from asserting
their rights by the expense they would incur.
Additionally, a new breed of civil case seems to crowd our dockets.
These monkey puzzles feature fact patterns of byzantine proportions.
Yet, the legal issues presented are often either insignificant or long settled
questions. Such cases represent a tremendously wasteful expenditure of
the time and resources of the federal courts. Page upon page of exhibits
and supporting affidavits must be read and absorbed before the often simple legal question at the heart of the matter is even considered.
Some of these cases are the product of the plethora of new bases for
litigation created by Congress in recent years. Our society is now paying
the price for its failure to provide sufficient judicial resources to cope
with Congress' past lawmaking binges. As ever-increasing resort is made
to the judiciary as the arbiters of all possible problems that befall society,
the lack of wherewithal to deal with those demands has caused the courts
to suffer the inevitable hangover.
New causes of action in areas of securities law, consumer protection,
workplace health and safety, credit practices and civil rights now consume a significant portion of the time of the courts. In addition, the
common law has been expanded. The area of products liability, for example, has seen unprecedented growth, as have many aspects of the
criminal law.
II.

GROWTH: THE OLD REMEDY

The traditional remedy for coping with the manifold expanding demands on the courts of appeals has been growth. In fact, adding more
judges historically has been the only real structural change in the federal
appellate system that the federal government has consistently embraced
since the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.10 Indeed, overcrowding was the
10. The Supreme Court has responded to its burgeoning caseload differently. Since,
unlike the court of appeals, the Supreme Court is not a court of error, it has the luxury of
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stimulus for the restructuring of the federal judiciary under the Evarts
Act 1 in 1891, which created the modem circuit courts of appeals.
In recent years, the number of judgeships has been increased with a
vengeance. While the courts of appeals grew at a fairly steady rate of
about ten new judges every twenty years until the late 1970s, the 1978
Omnibus Judgeship Act12 augmented the federal judiciary by 36 percent.
This meant a boost in the number of circuit judges from 94 in 1979 to
124 in 1980. Currently, there are 168 authorized positions in the courts
of appeals.1 3 The procedure by which the new positions were added, as
well as the consequences of the additions, have been much criticized.
Congress is expected to create more than sixty new judgeships during
the next legislative session. 14 Whether or not this increase will truly alleviate the malaise currently suffered by the judicial system or whether it
will, like all of the past increases, be just another "quick fix" is debatable.
Even if the most recent addition of federal judgeships at the appellate
level produces a more lasting effect, I am convinced that it is not the long
term answer to our current pressing need for judicial reform. Additional
judgeships are both an inefficient use of scant judicial resources and a
disruptive influence on the development of the law.
The process by which Congress creates federal judgeships has been
called haphazard and erratic. 5 Even those in favor of additional judgeships concede that while the need for federal judgeships has tended to
grow at a gradual and continuous rate, judges have been added in fits and
starts.16 Part of the difficulty is that all three branches of government are
involved in the process, and each might have a different notion of how
many, if any, judges should be added. Additionally, both the selection
and confirmation of judges are politicized activities. Nominations are
often awarded to the party faithful by the administration in power at the
time. If a majority of the Senate belongs to the opposing party, the confirmation process may become an opportunity for partisanship rather
than a search for excellent legal minds. Moreover, a Congress dominated
by one party is hesitant to create new positions for a president of the
controlling its caseload through the writ of certiorariprocedure. See Rehnquist, Whither
the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787 (July, 1974).
11. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; see C. Wright, The Law of Federal
Courts 6 (1983).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629.
13. See 1987 Mechamn Report, supra note 8, at 51, table 20. At present, 8 of these
positions are vacant and there are 58 Senior Circuit Judges.
14. See Roberts, Reagan'sLegions of Nominees Put His Own Stamp on the Judiciary,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1988, § 4, at E5, col. 1. Last September, the Judicial Conference
voted to ask Congress to create 14 new court of appeals judgeships and 37 permanent and
22 temporary district court judgeships.
15. See, eg., C. Baar, Judgeship Creation in the Federal Courts: Options for Reform

1 (1981).
16. See Mikva, More Judgeships-ButNot All At Once, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 23,

26-27 (1982).
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other party to fill. And, of course, there are intraparty vagaries associated with the selection of individual candidates.
Justice Felix Frankfurter warned early on of the consequences of expanding the federal judiciary:
The business of courts, particularly of the federal courts, is drastically
unlike the business of factories. The function and role of the federal
courts and the nature of their judicial process involve impalpable factors, subtle but far-reaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the
judicial plant .... In the farthest reaches of the problem a steady
increase in judges does not alleviate; in my judgment, it is bound to
depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary and thereby adversely to
affect the whole system. 17
Frankfurter's intuition that adding judges might impede, rather than facilitate, the functioning of the federal courts bears closer scrutiny. The
judicial process, like the artistic process, may be hindered, not enhanced,
by simple multiplication.
A. An Inefficient Response
Adding new judges may not be efficient in simple economic terms. According to the Administrative Office, the estimated cost of establishing a
single new court of appeals judge is about $630,000.18 Maintaining the
new judge and his staff amounts to an estimated annual cost of about
$478,000.19 Obviously, these costs rapidly spiral into the tens of millions
when the addition of a dozen or more new judges is contemplated.
There are other important costs to be considered as well. One of great
concern to me is the possible loss of collegiality. Learned Hand's Second
Circuit was composed of only six judges. I believe that the thirteen active judges (presently, one position has been vacant for more than a year)
and four senior judges of the current Second Circuit can lay claim to a
level of collegiality similar to that great court. However, I can only speculate as to the difficulties my colleagues and I would face in maintaining
a collegial atmosphere if we are to face further increments of judges. For
a process rooted in opinion and consensus, the problem is not ephemeral.
Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit explained: "[F]ew judges who
have sat on an appellate court would deny that-to some unquantifiable
degree-the impediments to collegiality that stem from the sheer number
of members of the court reduce the overall quality of the court's work
product."2
17. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
18. Telephone interview with David Sellers, Public Information Officer, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Nov. 14, 1988). The figures are estimates of the
Administrative Office Budget Branch, as of December 14, 1987, and are available upon
request from the Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
19. Id.
20. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived 'Bureaucracy' of the Federal
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B. A Disruptive Influence

Even more worrisome is the possibility that additional judges may disrupt the development of the common law. The coherence and uniformity
of the law are bound to decline with the addition of new judges. Such
instability can have a snowball effect. The judicial workload is increased
because more panel rehearings and en banc votes are required. And the
uncertainty of outcomes resulting from a cacophony of differing opinions
can act as a catalyst for new appeals as more litigants find a roll of the
appellate dice worth the chance.
Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit described the problem in the context of the old Fifth Circuit before it was split into the current Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits:
If you have three judges on a court of appeals, the law is stable....
When you add the fourth judge to that court, you add some instability
to the rule of law in that circuit because another point of view is added
to the decision making. When you add the fifth judge, the sixth judge,
when you get as large as the old Fifth Circuit was, with twenty-six
judges, the law becomes extremely unstable. One of several thousand
different panel combinations will decide the case, will interpret the law.
Even if the court has a rule, as we did in the old Fifth, that one panel
cannot overrule another, a court of twenty-six will still produce irreconcilable statements of the law.2 1
At present the Ninth Circuit has twenty-five active circuit judges and
eleven senior circuit judges.2 2 Its large size has led that circuit to provide
for "limited en banc" procedures in which only eleven judges vote. Of
course each of the twenty-five active judges still faces the time-consuming
task of carefully reviewing for petitions en banc.
The en banc proceeding illustrates precisely the types of problems that
are likely to follow continued increases in the number of circuit judges.
Advocates of a liberal use of en bancs trumpet the definitive resolution of
intracircuit conflicts as their major advantage. Critics urge that protracted proceedings that fail the test of finality and merely serve to exacerbate conflicts will consume precious judicial resources and undermine
the panel system.
En banc opinions must be written and circulated among the members
of the en banc court; invariably they spark a blizzard of memoranda in
an effort to forge a consensus. It is axiomatic that three judges, in an
intimate conference, will find the heart of a case more quickly than will
eleven. The ultimate delay occasioned by the en banc proceeding is startling. The interval between oral argument and en banc disposition is, on
Courts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the Searchfor AppropriateRemedies, 68 Iowa L.
Rev. 871, 919 (1983).
21. Interview with Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, reprinted in 15 The Third Branch,
Apr., 1983, at 1, 3-4.
22. See United States Court Directory 27-30 (March 1988).
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average, five times as great as that for a panel disposition. This delay
burdens the bench, the bar and most importantly, the litigants.
Yet, there are those who argue that these substantial delays and inefficiencies are a small price to pay for uniformity of decision. An unfortunate irony of the en banc proceeding in many circuits is the frequency
with which it produces either a majority opinion that was crafted in a
purposefully vague manner to forge a consensus within the court, or a
litany of diverging opinions, injecting a degree of uncertainty into the law
that we can well do without.
Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Watt 2" provides a singular
example of the obfuscatory potential of allowing "too many cooks" to
contribute to the jurisprudential soup. That case, involving the right of
demonstrators to sleep in a park as a means of protesting federal policies
affecting the poor and homeless, required the court to balance the vying
interests of expression protected by the first amendment on the one hand
and governmental regulations on the other. The en banc opinions resulted in a smorgasbord of six judicial pronouncements-from the eleven
judges on the court--on the parameters of first amendment protection,
informed as much by ideological splits as by constitutional principles.
Indeed, the extreme confusion is captured by the West headnote for the
case:
Mikva, Circuit Judge, filed opinion in support of reversal in which
Wald, Circuit Judge, concurred.
Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Chief Judge, and J. Skelly Wright,
Circuit Judge, fied concurring statement.
Harry T. Edwards, Circuit Judge, concurred and filed opinion.
Ginsburg, Circuit Judge, concurred in the judgment and fied
opinion.
Wilkey, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion in which Tamm,
MacKinnon, Bork, and Scalia, Circuit Judges, joined.
Scalia, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion in which MacKinnon and Bork, Circuit Judges, concurred. 24
I recall Judge Charles Clark, former Chief Judge of the Second Circuit,
saying on several occasions that the en bane proceeding raised more
questions than it settled. Additional judgeships would have a similar result. The fate of Community for Creative Non- Violence could befall the
entire case law of the circuit courts of appeals, if the din of more and
more voices is allowed to garble the message of the federal appellate
judiciary.
C. A Decline in Prestige
As Justice Frankfurter noted early on, the government's ability to attract and retain capable judges is, at least partially, inversely propor23. 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
24. Id. at 586.
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tional to the size of the federal judiciary.2" Until 1980, the total
authorized number of lifetime appointments to the courts of appeals was
fewer than the number of United States senators.2 6 The attraction of
exclusivity is only human. An influx of new judges is bound eventually
to devalue the judicial currency. Several years ago, then Justice Rehnquist commented:
To the extent that the element of prestige is gradually phased out of
any judgeship, whether federal or state, we run the risk of depleting
even further the reservoir of available talent to fill the judgeship.2 7
Of course, salary and other conditions of employment are also factors
in the equation. Higher private sector salaries are already a substantial
deterrent to talented lawyers seeking judgeships. As Judge Oakes of the
Second Circuit noted in a recent address, "[t]hat the judicial salaries are
roughly in the category of third-year associates in the larger city firms is
somewhat degrading."2 The loss of prestige occasioned by constant increases in the number of federal judges would only further deplete the
package of benefits that, in the past, attracted some of the leading lights
of the bar to the judiciary.
III.
A.

SOME NEW REMEDIES

The Civil Appeals Management Plan

For years I observed and participated in the operation of pre-trial conferences in our district courts, and my experiences convinced me that
introduction of a similar program on the appellate level would produce
equally fruitful results. Fourteen years ago, during my first year as Chief
Judge of the Second Circuit, I proposed a program for appellate proceedings which injected court-sponsored mediation in settlement proceedings
into appellate litigation. Instituted in 1974, the Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP) 29 had several major aims: first, to encourage the res25. Cf.Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (increases in the number of federal judgeships will depreciate the
quality of the judiciary).
26. See R. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 357 app. B (1985).
27. Address by Justice Rehnquist, Mac Swinford Lecture, University of Kentucky 17
(Sept. 23, 1982) (available upon request from the Public Information Office, United States
Supreme Court). Some argue that there has been a general decline in the prestige of
judges for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Judge Owen McGivern, The Decline of the
Judiciary, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
28. Judge James L. Oakes, ChangingPerspectivesof Judging,1947-1987, 22 Nebraska
Transcript, Summer 1988, at 24, 27.
29. CAMP rules have the force and effect of local court rules. See Civil Appeals
Management Plan, reprinted in The Comm. on Fed. Courts of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, Appeals to the Second Circuit 113-20 (6th ed. 1988) [hereinafter
CAMP Rules]; see also United States Courts of Appeals Rules, Second Circuit, 28
U.S.C.A. Rules at 487-93 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
CAMP has its roots in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, which provides:
The court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before the court
or a judge thereof for a prehearing conference to consider the simplification of
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olution of appeals without participation by judges, thereby preserving
time, their scarcest and most precious asset; second, to expedite the consideration of appeals that will be briefed and argued; third, to have staff
counsel help the parties clarify the issues on appeal; and fourth, to dispose of minor procedural motions without expenditure of judicial resources. CAMP was unique among appellate case management
programs because it undertook to wrestle with overcrowded dockets in a
manner that was not purely administrative.3 0
The centerpiece of CAMP is the staff counsel, who conducts the preargument conference and is responsible for administration of the program.31 With few exceptions, all civil cases docketed in the Second Circuit are referred to CAMP.3" The appellant must submit a "preargument statement" within ten days of docketing an appeal." Shortly
thereafter, staff counsel issues a scheduling order, designating the week of
argument, the proposed date for a CAMP conference, and deadlines for
the filing of the record and briefs.3 4 Staff counsel is also authorized to
dispose of motions dealing with the filing of oversize briefs.
Staff counsel, attorneys for the parties, and on occasion the parties
themselves, participate in the conferences, which may last from one hour
to several hours. When necessary, more than one conference is held. If
the parties fail to resolve the dispute at conference, however, they retain
the right to proceed to briefing and oral argument.
For staff counsel, the most gratifying aspect of CAMP is the role he
the issues and such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceeding
by the court. The court or judge shall make an order which recites the action
taken at the conference and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the
matters considered and which limits the issues to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel, and such order when entered controls the
subsequent course of the proceeding, unless modified to prevent manifest
injustice.
Fed. R. App. P. 33.
30. CAMP has enjoyed an impressive record to date. CAMP accounted for 541 of
the 2,944 cases disposed of by the Second Circuit during the year ending June 30, 1988.
Another 1,109 cases were dismissed without a hearing on the merits, mostly through
default, failure to meet filing deadlines, and non-CAMP settlement. CAMP's 18 percent
decrease in cases requiring the time and resources of the circuit judges doubtless contributed to the court's ability to clear its calendar.
31. The Second Circuit now has two full-time staff counsel.
32. See Kaufman, The Second CircuitReview--SafeguardingJudicialResources: The
Joint Duty of Bench and Bar, 52 Brooklyn L. Rev. 579, 586 n.24 (1986). An interesting
by-product of CAMP was its use by the parties in ways never contemplated by its founders. In some large multi-defendant criminal cases, the parties asked for conferences to
set dates for briefing and argument. They also capitalized upon this opportunity to avoid
repetition in briefs and in the appendices, and to select a mutually acceptable lead counsel. This procedure is now conducted by a non-CAMP Staff Attorney in those multidefendant actions that present intricate scheduling problems.
33. See CAMP Rules, supra note 29, at 113 (Rule 3(a)).
34. See id. at 114 (Rule 4). The underlying concept of CAMP is that parties are more
likely to resolve their differences before argument if they have not already invested large
amounts of time and money in the preparation of the appeal. The first conference is,
therefore, scheduled well in advance of the deadline for the filing of briefs.
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plays in encouraging settlement. As one staff counsel explained, CAMP
can, at its best, serve a "healing function" for parties who have been
further driven apart by the litigation process. 35 At the pre-argument
conference, staff counsel invites the parties to state their views on the
facts and legal issues of the case and to discuss the lower court opinion.
While strictly abiding by the policy against coercing settlement, staff
counsel does not hesitate to point out weaknesses in an attorney's argument, or to recommend withdrawal of frivolous or hopeless appeals.
The Second Circuit vests considerable authority in staff counsel, so
counsel for the parties are expected to approach these conferences seriously and to make a good-faith effort to resolve disputes before argument
when possible. The pre-argument conference guidelines advise counsel
to be "thoroughly prepared to discuss in depth the alleged errors and the
reasons for their positions," and to "obtain advance authority from their
36
clients to make such commitments as may reasonably be anticipated.
Participation in the CAMP conference is required of counsel, but the
ultimate decision to settle, withdraw, or proceed to briefing and argument remains, of course, with the parties. Participation by judges in preargument conferences is a debatable issue,37 primarily because the psychological effect of having a judge conduct a conference is difficult to
evaluate. The Second Circuit has insisted on excluding judges from participating in CAMP procedures. By keeping judges out of the conferences, CAMP reduces the demand on judicial resources and prevents the
need for a judge to disqualify himself from an appeal because he had been
present at the conference. The absence of judges also promotes a greater
degree of candor.
By far the most important reason for withholding judicial participation
in CAMP, however, is to avoid any perception that the court is attempting to pressure the parties to settle or withdraw the appeal. Staff counsel
may provide the parties with a candid and objective assessment of their
arguments. On occasion, he will go so far as to predict the outcome of
the appeal. Because ordinary words assume unintended significance
when clothed in judicial garb-staff counsel do not wear robes or preside
in a courtroom, and the proceedings have an air of informality-similar
comments, if uttered by a judge, would likely be viewed more as threats
than as advice. To further promote candor in conferences, CAMP guidelines prohibit counsel for the parties, or anyone else, from informing
35. Interview with Frank Scardilli, Staff Counsel for CAMP, in New York City (Oct.

18, 1985).

36. CAMP Rules, supra note 29, at 121 (Guidelines for Conduct of Pre-Argument
Conference).
37. The Seventh Circuit experimented with the effect of participation of judges in preargument conferences by holding staff counsel conferences with and without judges present. See J. Goldman, The Seventh Circuit Preappeal Program: An Evaluation (1982).
The results of the experiment, however, showed that the presence of a judge in a preargument conference does not significantly affect the outcome of the conference. See id.
at 43.
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members of the court about discussions or actions at a conference.3 8 A
party that breaches this confidence may be censured by the court.
I have long suspected the best justice is done when the parties voluntarily abandon litigation in favor of a solution that does not leave one party
badly scarred and the other exalted. This is not merely a casual observation. Rather, it is a humble acknowledgement that the world is amorphous and is colored by emotions and experiences that are the very soul
of the law. In another context, Edmund Burke observed: "All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every
prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter."39 In CAMP I foresaw the possibility, and now have observed the reality, of recovering
some of the humanity the judicial system has lost in trying to keep pace
with the nation's explosion of litigation.
Regrettably, the tradition and propriety of the judicial office has
prompted some to view the pursuit of compromise as incongruous with
the judge's role. CAMP's most readily apparent contribution may be the
expedition of case processing, but its success for over a decade also has a
more profound meaning-that settlement and compromise are neither
beyond the reach, nor beneath the dignity, of our intermediate appellate
courts.
B.

PrivateJudging

Another potential avenue of judicial reform is private judging."
Faced with the avalanche of litigation, an increasing number of litigants
are turning away from the state and federal courts to a growing network
of private courts. The attractions are obvious. Private judging offers a
prompt, comparatively inexpensive trial scheduled at the parties' convenience. It provides the opportunity to select the judge by agreement of the
parties, and to ensure that he or she is knowledgeable in the particular
subject under scrutiny. Use of private judges offers a way to avoid the
inevitable publicity that accompanies a public trial. It also prevents confidential information from reaching the public domain. Most importantly in the minds of some observers, it indirectly speeds the wheels of
justice in the public courts by removing a number of cases from the
system.
Private judging takes several different forms. The parties' consensual
decision to seek private adjudication may be sanctioned and regulated by
statute. At other times, the arrangement is purely private. In some
38. See CAMP Rules, supra note 29, at 122 (Guidelines for Conduct of Pre-Argument Conference); In re Lake Utopia Paper, 608 F.2d 928, 929-930 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
39. Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliationwith America, in 1 The Works of Edmund
Burke 450, 500 (George Bell & Sons 1886).
40. For more discussion of the Author's views on the ramifications of private judging,
see Kaufman, Crowded Courtrooms: Jury's Still Out on Judges-for-Hire, Wall St. J., Nov.
9, 1988, at A22, col. 3.
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states, most notably California, where the process is known as "reference," the private judge is empowered by state law to render a final decision binding on the parties.4 1 Federal practice contains a modified and
little used version of this procedure. In "exceptional" circumstances, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the appointment of a special
master.4' The master's findings of fact, however, are binding only with
prior consent of the parties.
Under California's procedure, the formality of the trial varies according to the parties' preference. The testimony of witnesses need not be
recorded in any fashion.4 3 By agreement, the prevailing California rules
of evidence and procedure may be ignored. The structure of a private
judicial decision can also be tailored by prior agreement. A simple conclusory statement, X owes Y $10,000, is sufficient. Judges' fees, often
$300 per hour for trial time and $150 per hour for deliberation, are generally split equally.
The popularity of private judging rests on the five basic characteristics
that set it apart from the public judicial system. Briefly noted, these advantages are speed, reduced costs, convenience, flexibility and privacy.
The success of private judging depends on its ability to deliver, in the
words of one promotional flier, "streamlined, cost efficient" justice.'
These factors are especially attractive to corporate and wealthy litigants.
Yet, there are a substantial number of unresolved problems with private judging. In an almost invidious way, the new procedure may nurture litigiousness by so tailoring the judicial process to the disputants'
needs that bringing a law suit becomes an attractive option.
Another problem is that the message of a sanctioned, encouraged, or
even condoned private court system may be contradictory. The existence
of a private judiciary with different operative principles might impair the
legitimacy of the public courts and their role in society. From a young
age, we are taught to revere the judiciary for its fairness and wisdom. We
invest the courts with an almost ecclesiastic authority to interpret constitutional and community values. Much of the respect for the judiciary as
an institution stems from the perceived fairness of the adjudicatory process. The use of private judging on a large scale could erode the core
support for the rule of law in our society.
In the same vein, other long-term effects on the judiciary caused by the
growth of private courts may also prove problematic. A deep concern is
the possibility that judges will be lured from the public bench by the
prospect of significantly greater remuneration in the private courts. But,
41. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 644 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988). See generally Note,
The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Considerations of
Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1592 (1981).
42. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
43. See Note, supra note 41, at 1598 n.25.
44. Judicate, Inc., The National Private Court System 3 (1988) (available upon request from Judicate, Inc., Philadelphia, PA).
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most worrisome, widespread use of private courts could stunt the growth
of the common law. Attracted by the speed and cost of the new bargain
justice, parties could take important cases in commercial and property
law, to name a few of the areas best suited to private judging, from the
public system.
This latter concern could marginalize the courts' role in our communities. Not only are dockets ever increasing but criminal trials and appeals
have become a veritable growth industry in the federal and state courts.
State prisoners, for example, brought 23 percent more appeals to the federal courts in 1987 than in 1986. 45 With the trend toward taking business and family disputes out of the courts, the public courts could
become specialized arbiters of law in criminal law or in other important
areas. Even public law cases--employment discrimination, for example--could be tried by a private judge utilizing public precedent. If these
trends continue, lawyers may be able to shop for the system they think
most likely to render a favorable result. These possibilities would also
contribute to the receding societal role for the judiciary.
Despite such grim prognostications, private judging persists. Like
Circe, private judging's attractions are irresistible to those who hear
them. The ability to have a case scheduled purely at the parties' convenience, the luxury of choosing your judge by consent, and a quick and
relatively cheap resolution are mesmerizing charms indeed. The jury is
still out on private judging. Despite many reservations, I eagerly await
developments of the idea.
C. Other Avenues
My continued enthusiasm for CAMP and my cautious appraisal of
private judging are mirrored in my feelings for several other proposals
for judicial reform currently on the table. While the following options
are not as novel as CAMP and private judging, they also appear to be
promising pathways toward an improved federal judiciary.
1. Increased Use of Arbitration
While arbitration is not new, it has, in recent years, achieved a new
level of respectability. Most recently, the Supreme Court in Shearson!
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 6 determined that federal securities
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are arbitrable. In
1985, the Court decided that federal antitrust issues were arbitrable.47
Other recent cases suggest a trend toward expanding the scope and legitimacy of arbitration.a
45.
46.
47.
48.
courts
court);

See 1987 Mecham Report, supra note 8, at 11.
107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343 (1987).
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (lower federal
may not stay arbitration pending resolution of the non-arbitrable claims by the
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (federal rather than state law gov-
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This new acceptance of arbitration as a tool of alternative dispute resolution is encouraging. Nonetheless, numerous issues remain to be resolved before the federal judiciary can count on arbitration as a
substantial aid in stemming the flow of litigation. Particularly, the contours of arbitration's niche in the federal court system remain unclear.
The federal courts play an important, if limited, role in supervising
arbitration. They may become involved at the initiation of an arbitration
proceeding if the parties disagree as to the scope or existence of an arbitration agreement, or if they believe there are important public policy
implications to enforcing the provision. And, they must, of course, be
called upon to enforce the final award.
But crucial questions of the relationship between the courts and arbitral tribunals remain. For example, when, if ever, are the decisions of
arbitrators entitled to collateral estoppel? And, what effect is to be given
arbitration awards in the arena of international law? Clearly, until such
questions are answered, arbitration will lack the certainty and predictability necessary for it to reach its potential as a tool of justice. Fortunately, the Supreme Court's recent willingness to examine arbitration
suggests that the requisite development is at hand.
2.

Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction

I am not as confident that the federal courts will soon see the end of
another plague-diversity jurisdiction. The number of cases reaching the
federal trial courts under diversity jurisdiction rose from 39,3 15 in 1980'9
to a high of 67,071 in 1987.50 Clearly, something must be done. Congress has considered abolishing diversity jurisdiction on several occasions, but has resisted such a fundamental change in the structure of the
judiciary1
The typical legislative response to judicial overload has instead been to
raise the amount in controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction. In
1887, in response to the increased congestion occasioned by the broadening federal jurisdiction, Congress increased the jurisdictional amount to
$2,000 to no avail. The year 1911 saw a further boost to $3,000. The
present jurisdictional amount of $10,000 was instituted in 1958.12 In anerns the validity, enforceability and scope of commercial arbitration agreements in state
as well as in federal courts). But see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (claims under
Securities Act of 1933 not arbitrable).
49. See L. Mecham, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts 373 app. table C2, reprintedin Reports of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (1980).
50. See 1987 Mecham Report, supra note 8, at 177 table C2.
51. See, e.g., H.R. 4314, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprintedin FederalDiversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1978).
52. See Act of July 25, Pub. L. No. 58-554, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332 (1982)).
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other attempt to reduce the strain on the federal judiciary, a current
House bill, if passed, will raise the amount in controversy requiremerit to
$50,000.1 There is no reason to expect that this increase in the amount
necessary for federal jurisdiction will have any more ameliorative effect
than past increases. The only likely change will be in the amount of
damages claimed in the pleadings.
3.

Increased Use of Staff Specialists

Retaining the services of experts who have mastered certain legal specialties is another procedure that might prove beneficial for court units of
appropriate size, such as an entire federal circuit or a large district
court. 4 This proposal goes far beyond such obvious and mundane tasks
as assisting with pretrial hearings and motions. I foresee that, in the next
century of the federal judiciary, the courts may request the disinterested
expert opinions of legal scholars on complicated, specialized or unusually
important issues. This is especially true in light of the growth of factually-complex civil case law noted above. Moreover, a substantial increase
in law clerks might be avoided. The state could provide for the printing
of the amicus briefs of experts, and perhaps also some modest compensation. Indeed, we might well develop a "tradition of regarding such public service as one of the most honorable responsibilities of the
profession."5 5
The use of staff specialists may further additional goals as well. Litigants could be saved most of the cost associated with use of the "language of the law," without any diminution in the quality of legal analysis
presented to the courts, if these staff memoranda were prepared as a matter of course in every appropriate case. These briefs and memoranda
would not only point out any important cases or issues overlooked by the
parties in their briefs;56 in addition, by focusing the parties' and courts'
attention on the legal issues truly in controversy and on the evidence
necessary to resolve them, such adjunct views, much like pretrial conferences, would save time and money in preparing for trial and appeal.
CONCLUSION

Reflecting on my forty years on the federal bench, I am struck anew by
the truth of Sir Francis Bacon's observation that time is the "greatest
innovator" because it moves all things in the direction of entropy. It is
53. See The Federal Courts Study Act, H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong.
Rec. H10430, H10431 (1988). As of this writing, both houses of Congress have passed
the bill, and it has been sent to the President. See id. at H10441.
54. See D. Meador, Appellate Courts 118-19, 178-80 (1974).
55. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge'sRealm of Reason, 7 Utah L. Rev. 157,
170 (1960).
56. The Second Circuit was the first to employ staff law clerks to perform similar
functions with regard to pro se cases. See Flannery & Robbins, Pro Se Litigation, 41
Brooklyn L. Rev. 769, 771 & n.6 (1975).
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thus appropriate that I have here called for a type of "wisdom and counsel" necessary to counteract the impact on the courts which litigation in
the next century is certain to produce.
But time is the greatest innovator in another sense. Time sometimes
offers another chance. We, or those who come after us, are occasionally
allowed to learn from our mistakes. As someone so memorably remarked, "Tomorrow is another day." As we contemplate tomorrow, let
us examine our options with an innovative eye and an open mind.

